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rivate property generates wealth and preserves a necessary 
proportion of scarcity of assets. Although this is true for 
material assets, in the context of immaterial assets, 
especially for digital products, scarcity has been practically non-
existent, as it is possible to copy and replicate at zero marginal 
cost. In this scenario, not just the monetary value drops or 
reduces significantly as the attribution of authorship also becomes 
difficult or non-existent, hindering creators’ remuneration. The 
blockchain may redefine intellectual property enforcement. This 
paper analyzes this new kind of working space, where property 
rights may become incentives for production and economic 
development, or otherwise, another form of concentration of 
wealth and restrictions of access to culture and information. 
Intellectual property law has struggled to catch up with 
technology. Digitally-driven business models revolutionized the 
way authors create, publish, share or trade their production on 
the internet, weakening the effectiveness of the law for securing 
and enforcing rights to intangible assets and intellectual 
production that are so necessary for the development of society.  
This facilitated access to intellectual property does universalize 
knowledge, not only scientific, but also cultural, but it can also 
pose a risk to the viability of new creative processes, as it enables 
both paid and unpaid access to content. Authors seek incentives 
for production that, whether monetary or reputational, require 
authorship identification and enforcement of property rights. 
This paper begins by exploring how private property is related to 
economic development, using an economic analysis of law 
approach, associating scarcity with the allocation of goods and its 
relation to efficiency. 
Perhaps the solution to the dilemma between universalized access 
and fair remuneration to authors can be found in the new 
technologies. Therefore, this paper brings some information 
about blockchain technology that, due to its characteristics, may 
be problem-solving. Although legal and economic institutions 
that are prior to blockchain must provide guidelines so that this 
P 
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technology can be used to balance efforts and reward, maximizing 
incentives for productivity, but also ensuring fair competition and 
protection of public interest. 
Some of these institutions are analyzed in this paper, raising 
questions – and maybe some answers – about means and 
purposes of copyright protection in the blockchain era.   
§ 1 – PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
“He who has no hope that he shall reap, will not take the trouble 
to sow.”1 Private property ensures the owner’s right to use a good 
or asset for consumption and/or income generation (use rights of 
the property).2   
When it comes to economic activity, agents seek to maximize 
their payoffs, so viewing private property as an incentive or a 
reward for productivity puts it in a central position in the 
economic development process. Therefore, private property, as a 
legal and economic institution, fulfills not only individual needs, 
but also important social functions. Active production is 
conducive to human development. 
North defines poverty as a result of institutional constraints that 
define a set of payoffs to political or economic activity that do 
not encourage productive activity.3 
In this sense, efforts and labour are intrinsically related to private 
property. John Locke4 explored this idea as summed up: “[…] 
labour adds to nature something which unquestionably belongs to 
the labourer, things are mixed, so to say, with his labour, and 
hence become his property.”5 Later, Adam Smith elucidated the 
concept that “the property which every man has in his own 
labour, as it is the original foundation of all other property, so it is 
the most sacred and inviolable”6, and John Stuart Mill emphasized 
that property must be granted when “produced by their own 
exertions, or received either by gift or by fair agreement, without 
force or fraud, from those who produced it.”7 
So, use rights of the property owner are the broadest right to use 
things for economic purposes, directly or indirectly. The owner 
has the faculty to use, to perceive profits and to choose the 
 
1 J. BENTHAM, “Manual of Political Economy”, in J. BOWRING (ed.) The Writings of Jeremy 
Bentham, vol. 3. Edinburgh: W. Tait, 1843, p. 71. 
2 T. BESLEY, M. GATHAK, “Property Rights and Economic Development”, in 
D. RODRIK, M. ROSENZWEIG (Eds.), Handbook of Development Economics (eds), Vol. 5. 
North-Holland, Elsevier, 2010, p. 3. 
3 D. NORTH, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 110. 
4 J. LOCKE, “Political writings”. D. WOOTTON (Ed.). Hackett publishing co, inc. 1993. 
5 J. GRONOW, “John Locke, Adam Smith and Karl Marx’s Critique of Private Property”, 
in J. GRONOW (ed.), On the Formation of Marxism, Series: Historical Materialism Book 
Series, vol. 113. Brill Online, January 1st, 2016, p. 226. 
6 A. SMITH, The Wealth of Nations, Books IV-V, London, Penguin Books, 1999, p. 138. 
7 J. S. MILL, “A System of Logic”, in J. ROBSON (ed.), Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, 
Toronto, Toronto University Press, 1969, p. 218. 
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purpose and destination suited for it.8 This extension of rights 
applies not only to tangible assets, but also for intangible assets 
and intellectual production, as the creator or the producer has the 
right to earn profits from what was created, published and made 
available to trade. 
This is justified and thus legitimized by the concept of 
maximizing efficiency, which is a condition for economic 
development. By creating exclusivity over certain goods or assets, 
which are scarce, and defining property ownership, two main 
benefits arise: (i) it is less likely that the good will be underused; 
and (ii) preventing the tragedy of the commons.9 10 Effort-reward 
balance is established, moreover private property optimizes the 
allocation of rights. 
Maximizing wealth depends on maximizing the added value of all 
goods and services, given that value is determined by how much 
the owner would accept in order to sell it, or by how much a 
buyer would be willing to pay to purchase it – whichever is 
greater on a well-functioning market.11 
On this matter, the concepts of Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 
can be applied for better understanding. Marcia Carla Pereira 
Ribeiro e Irineu Galeski explain that in Pareto efficiency goods 
are transferred from those who value them least to those who 
value them most, in an exchange where an individual can have his 
or her situation improved, without worsening the conditions and 
situation of any other.12 While Kaldor-Hicks criterion is based on 
the premise that any economic or rights re-allocation is 
considered improved if those that are made better off can 
somehow compensate the ones that are made worse off, so that 
the total earnings outweigh any losses eventually suffered by 
some individuals.  
Private property, in this sense, is an instrument for efficient use 
and reallocation of resources, especially the scarce ones. The 
Kaldor-Hicks criterion explains that eventual losses for some 
individuals, arising from the absence of distributive or equitable 
aspects of private property, are compensated by social gains, 
legitimizing this fundamental institution for development. 
Therefore, private property must be enforced by a proper legal 
framework as an incentive for productivity.13 
 
8 O. GOMES, Contratos, Rio de Janeiro, Forense, 1995, p. 86. 
9 E. AGUSTINHO, “As tragédias dos comuns e dos anticomuns”, in M. C. P. RIBEIRO, 
V. KLEIN (eds), O que é Análise Econômica do Direito – uma introdução. Belo Horizonte, 
Fórum, 2011, 49-61. 
10 G. HARDIN, “The Tragedy of the Commons”, Science Mag, vol. 162, issue 3859, Dec. 
1968, pp. 1243-1248. 
11 W. LANDES, R. POSNER, “The Economic Structure of Tort Law”, Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 1987. 
12 M. C. P. RIBEIRO, I. GALESKI JUNIOR, Teoria Geral dos Contratos - Contratos Empresariais e 
Análise Econômica. Rio de Janeiro, Elsevier. 2009, p.86. 
13 R. COOTER, T. ULEN, Direito & Economia, Tradução de Luiz Marcos Sander e 
Francisco Araújo da Costa, 5th edition, Porto Alegre: Bookman, 2010, p. 90.  
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New Institutional Economics14 puts property rights as a central 
element of the institutional structure of economy, being one of 
the foundations of markets, trade and development. Institutions 
form the incentives structure in a society and, therefore, are 
determinant for the economic performance. Cooter and Ulen 
work with the idea of creating incentives to use resources in a 
more efficient way, given that effective use of resources 
maximizes the nation's wealth.15 
North and Thomas16 assert that efficient economic organization 
needs the establishment of institutional arrangements and 
property rights that create an incentive to channel individual 
economic effort into activities that bring the private rate of return 
close to the social rate of return. Thus, economic development 
entails having credible enforcement of property rights. 
§ 2 – CHALLENGES FOR DIGITAL PRODUCTS   
Property rights have different frameworks and effects when 
considering if related to tangible or intangible assets. Tangible 
assets, by their very nature, are subject to the principle of rivalry. 
That is, when someone uses the good, in principle, is not possible 
for someone else to use it under the same conditions and at the 
same time. Intangible assets, on the other hand, don’t necessarily 
have these limitations since anyone who can reproduce it can 
make use of it, even if there are multiple users at the same time 
and under the same conditions. 
For intangible assets, the principle of non-rivalry applies. 
Therefore, giving an example, if someone is not allowed to make 
use of a trademark created by someone else because of a 
registration that was granted to this person, it is because there is a 
right of exclusivity to the property holder. 
It is undeniable that development cannot be detached from 
innovation, and that innovation depends on creating and making 
new products and services available to the market. The process of 
innovation needs to be stimulated not only by rewards from the 
market, but also by the conditions in the process of creation. In 
the case of a patent for invention, not only the goods produced 
from the innovation, but also the inventor's intellectual rights 
need to be protected. 
Therefore, it is costly to produce, to invent and to create. But it is 
absolutely necessary to do so in order to maximize wealth. For 
Cooter & Schafer17 agree that economic development is enhanced 
 
14 D. NORTH, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
15 R. COOTER, T. ULEN, Law and Economics, 6th edition, Berkeley Law Books, Book 2, 
2016, p. 74. 
16 D. NORTH, R. THOMAS, The Rise of the Western World – A New Economic History, New 
York, Cambridge University Press, 1973, p. 1. 
17 R. COOTER, H. SCHAFER, O Nó de Salomão – Como o Direito Pode Erradicar a Pobreza das 
Nações, Tradução de Magnum Eltz, Curitiba, CRV, 2017, p.11. 
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through innovations This is intrinsically related to intellectual 
production and demands reliability.  
In this case, incentives come in the form of intellectual property. 
For copyright owners, the ability to exclude others from 
unauthorized access to their works is crucial to their profitability, 
ensuring that remuneration compensates and, even more, rewards 
for all the resources invested in the production. 
However, the greatest challenge for intangible assets is the lack of 
scarcity of the products available for use or purchase. It is 
possible for several agents to simultaneously use an intangible 
asset without interfering with each other, and without the product 
running out.18 And this became even harder as the internet and 
the World Wide Web gained ground spreading the culture of copy 
and paste, intensified on the Fourth Industrial Revolution 
context.19  
Furthermore, all kinds of intellectual production are now available 
as digital products. They were either created as digital products or 
were transferred to the digital world to be part of this market 
sphere. 
As a result, digitally-driven business models revolutionized the 
way authors create, publish, share or trade their production on 
the internet. It is so much easier to market a product worldwide 
where borders have become virtually non-existent, and this is 
really appealing for authors. Although, the possibility to replicate 
at lower or even zero marginal cost and the facilities to 
anonymize and plagiarize works on the internet, not just reduces 
significantly the monetary value of the products, but also the 
attribution of authorship becomes difficult or non-existent, 
hindering creators’ remuneration.  
Intangible assets usually demand high initial investment as 
intellectual capital measured by education, on-the-job training, 
research and development expenditures, among others20, and 
markets depend on private property rights that are stable, well 
defined and well enforced, so that it can be also fairly priced. 
There are few incentives for intellectual progress when there is no 
ownership and it is difficult to monetize and profit from the 
products. 
As Demsetz21 explains, “if a new idea is freely appropriable by all, 
if there exist communal rights to new ideas, incentives for 
developing such ideas will be lacking. The benefits derivable from 
these ideas will not be concentrated on their originators”, but 
with some degree of private rights to the originators, these ideas 
 
18 M.C. P. RIBEIRO, et al., “Direitos Autorais e Música - Tecnologia, Direito e 
Regulação”, Rev. Bras. Polít. Públicas, Brasília, vol. 7, No. 3, p. 511-537, 2017, p. 515. 
19 K. SCHWAB, A Quarta Revolução Industrial. Tradução de Daniel Moreira Miranda. São 
Paulo: Edipro, 2016, p. 13. 
20 J. COHEN, Intangible Assets - Valuation and Economic Benefit. John Wiley & Sons Inc., 
Hoboken, New Jersey, 2005, p. 31. 
21 H. DEMSETZ, Toward a Theory of Property Rights. The American Economic Review, 
vol. 57, no. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Seventy-ninth Annual Meeting of the 
American Economic Association, pp. 347-359, May, 1967, p. 359. 
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will come forth at a more rapid pace. Although the author affirms 
that the existence of the private rights “does not mean that their 
effects on the property of others will be directly taken into 
account”22, as a new idea makes an old one obsolete and another 
old one more valuable, and these effects will not be directly taken 
into account, but they can be called to the attention of the 
originator of the new idea through market negotiations. 
Bentham23 bases on the principle of utility, which states that the 
merit of an action is determined solely on the basis of how 
beneficial it tends to be to all those it will affect. Intellectual 
production is beneficial for the whole society, so the authors 
reward is based on merit and utility, and has to be proportional to 
the benefits it creates. Otherwise, copyright protection could be 
exacerbated to the point where the incentives structure would 
turn into a constraints structure. It is a cost-benefit analysis. For 
Bentham24, if the reward is too low, not enough people will 
undertake that activity, or will perform that work to a merely 
acceptable level.  
On a Law and Economics approach, authorship and intellectual 
property rights enable the most efficient use and allocation of 
resources, as previously explained. On a New Institutional 
Economics approach, intellectual property is an institution that 
must be combined with other political and economic institutions 
– considering, for instance, means and terms for the copyright 
protection – creating an optimal-efficient arrangement of 
institutions to boost development. 
§ 3 – BLOCKCHAIN FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ENFORCEMENT   
With the advent of the digitalization, enormous quantities of 
copyrighted material became readily available to anyone.25 So, the 
internet has democratized access to various content, but also 
increased copyright infringement, as widespread access to 
intellectual property includes unauthorized or improper access to 
creations. 
The greatest challenge is to find the means to oversee, control 
and regulate use and abuse of copyrighted digital products. On 
this matter, blockchain is a promising technology as it is supposed 
to record and track access and use of anything of value in a 
transparent and safe system – a distributed trust network, or, as 
 
22 Ibidem, p. 359. 
23 J. BENTHAM, “An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation”, in 
J. BURNS, L. HART (eds.), The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, London, The Athlone 
Press, 1970. 
24 J. BENTHAM, “Manual of Political Economy”, in J. BOWRING (ed.) The Writings of 
Jeremy Bentham, Vol. 3. Edinburgh: W. Tait, 1843. 
25 J. COHEN, Intangible Assets – Valuation and Economic Benefit, John Wiley & Sons Inc., 
Hoboken, New Jersey, 2005, p. 15. 
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Davidson, De Filippi and Potts26 conceptualize it, a “distributed 
ledger technology”. 
Internet has enabled many positive changes, but it has serious 
risks for business and economic activities. Under the first 
generation of the internet, many creators of intellectual property 
did not receive proper compensation for it.27 
However, blockchain is a new digital ledger of economic 
transactions that can be programmed to record virtually 
everything of value and importance for humankind, for example: 
certificates, licenses, financial accounts and anything that can be 
expressed in code, including, for the purpose of the present 
paper, titles of ownership of intellectual property. “We can ensure 
that creators are compensated for their intellectual property […] 
Every cultural industry is up for disruption and the promise is 
that creators get fully compensated for the value they create.”28 
That is because rights can be recorded on the blockchain so that 
the rights holder cannot be violated. 
Urban and Pineda describe blockchain technology as a digital 
ledger that lists the ownership of a set of assets and an essentially 
tamper-proof transaction history for those assets: “Blockchains 
are operated by a peer-to-peer (P2P) network of computers in 
which each of the computers that form a node on the network 
independently maintains a complete copy of the ledger”29, and 
because every transaction is recorded on the blockchain, it is 
possible to trace the entire transaction history.  
The authors assert that blockchain offers significant innovations 
in terms of organizing and coordinating information systems and 
tracking a variety of assets with integrity and reliability of the 
information recorded on it, that enable greater efficiency and 
decentralization which could help secure greater privacy and a 
more even distribution of economic and social power.30 
As Zylbersztajn & Sztajn31 clarify, better defined property rights 
generates less transaction costs. If the owners and their rights are 
predefined, there will be greater welfare for a larger number of 
individuals, because in general the benefits will be greater than the 
losses, arising from greater marginal utility. 
Even if the author seeks only reputation as a reward for 
intellectual production, there is a need for authorship to be well 
defined and protected. Blockchain provides means of proving the 
authorship, ownership and preserving records. 
 
26 S. DAVIDSON, et al. Disrupting Governance - The New Institutional Economics of Distributed 
Ledger Technology. July 19, 2016. 
27 D. TAPSCOTT, A. TAPSCOTT. Blockchain Revolution. New York, Portfolio Penguim, 
2016, p.21. 
28 Ibidem, p.14. 
29 M. URBAN, D. PINEDA, Inside the Black Blocks - A Policymaker’s Introduction to Blockchain, 
Distributed Ledger Technology and the “Internet of Value”. Mowat Centre. Munk School of 
Global Affairs & Public Policy. Mowat Research #168, August, 2018, p. 8. 
30 Ibidem, pp. 2-3. 
31 D. ZYLBERSZTAJN, R. SZTAJN. “Law and Economics”, in D. ZYLBERSZTAJN, R. 
SZTAJN (eds.), Direito e Economia - Análise Econômica do Direito e das Organizações, Rio de 
Janeiro, Elsevier, 2005, p.76. 
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Tapscott & Tapscott explain how it works: “A smart contract 
provides a means for assigning usage rights to another party […] 
The code of the contract could include the term or duration of 
the assignment, the magnitude of royalties […] and some triggers 
for terminating the contract”32, when the access to the work 
registered on the blockchain would no longer be permitted.  
A wide variety of business models can be created from this 
technology, and the author can decide for the one he or she finds 
most viable or profitable. A video or a song, for example, may be 
restricted to be reproduced by only one user at a time; or perhaps 
the first reproduction of a video or song for a user is free, but 
subsequent reproductions must be paid for. And so on, scarcity 
becomes an attribute that can be shaped as needed, or according 
to the author's creativity. 
It is clear that blockchain, so far, does not change the institutions 
of private property. It is itself a groundbreaking institution for 
ensuring contractual compliance and enforcement on property 
rights, alongside being a tool for greater efficiency on digitally-
driven markets, focusing on blockchains as a new form of 
governance. “In this governance centred view, blockchains 
compete with firms, markets and economies, as institutional 
alternatives for coordinating the economic actions of groups of 
people”.33 
Blockchain economizes transactions costs – as transactions costs 
are explained by Williamson34 – of monitoring and enforcing 
intellectual property rights, mitigating opportunism. Therefore, 
from the perspective of New Institutional Economics, blockchain 
helps to create a more efficient institutional arrangement. 
§ 4 – INCENTIVE FOR PRODUCTION OR CONCENTRATION OF 
WEALTH?  
Intellectual and creative progress are of public interest but had 
been threatened by the difficulty of enforcement of intellectual 
property rights on the internet, which was caused by abusive 
access to copyrighted digital products.  
Clearly, access to information, knowledge, culture, education, and 
content on research and development are all of relevant public 
interest35, but, in analogy to the tragedy of the commons36, it 
cannot hinder incentives for further production. Whether 
 
32 D. TAPSCOTT, A. TAPSCOTT. Blockchain Revolution. New York, Portfolio Penguim, 
2016, p.47. 
33 S. DAVIDSON, et al. Disrupting Governance - The New Institutional Economics of Distributed 
Ledger Technology. July 19, 2016, p.3. 
34 “Transaction costs are the economic equivalent of friction in physical systems.” O. 
WILLIAMSON, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York, The Free Press, 1985, 
p.19. 
35 M.C. P. RIBEIRO, et al. Direitos Autorais e Música - Tecnologia, Direito e Regulação. Rev. 
Bras. Polít. Públicas, Brasília, v. 7, n 3, p.511-537, 2017, p.519. 
36 G. HARDIN, “The Tragedy of the Commons”, Science Mag, vol. 162, issue 3859, Dec. 
1968, pp. 1243-1248. 
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monetary or reputational, these incentives require authorship 
identification and enforcement of property rights. 
If the institutions of ownership on blockchain are indeed 
transparent and enforceable, is this technology a step forward? 
Property rights have the potential to generate wealth by incentives 
for production, but not surely to distribute wealth. The first 
generation of internet, before blockchain, turned out to be a 
concentration of few powerful corporations and platforms that 
dominate markets3738, resulting in even greater concentration of 
wealth. “Despite the promise of a peer-to-peer empowered world, 
the economic and political benefits have proven to be 
asymmetrical – with power and prosperity channeled to those 
who already have it.”39 
Is blockchain a chance to do things differently? New technologies 
not only modify what we do, but how we do it.40 If it is certain 
that private property is a central element of markets, for 
generating wealth and economic development, it is established 
that the protection of property is something that must be done. 
But the blockchain opens up a range of possibilities on how to do 
it, as scarcity and enforcement can be shaped using this 
technology. The issues that emerge involve making decisions 
about the criteria that will be used to define how long, for what 
purposes, and for whom a particular product will be scarce. This 
decision cannot be limited solely to profitability aspects and 
business models, given that there is a relevant public interest in 
accessing intellectual production. 
It is still early to identify advantages and disadvantages, but by the 
premises of New Institutional Economics, it will depend on the 
arrangements with other institutions.41 
Economic activities evolve over time, business models are 
constantly changing, so property rights’ institutions, both formal 
and informal, may need a reappraisal to ensure that their purpose 
of efficiency and development is being fulfilled.  
Cooter & Ulen affirm that patents and copyright are temporary 
monopolies that can vary in breadth and duration, and narrowing 
the breadth or shortening the duration of intellectual property 
rights often decreases monopoly profits and increases 
dissemination; on the other hand, broadening the scope or 
duration of the creator’s property rights increases monopoly 
 
37 D. TAPSCOTT, A. TAPSCOTT. Blockchain Revolution. New York, Portfolio Penguim, 
2016. 
38 M.C. P. RIBEIRO, et al., “Direitos Autorais e Música - Tecnologia, Direito e 
Regulação”, Rev. Bras. Polít. Públicas, Brasília, v. 7, n 3, p.511-537, 2017, p. 514. 
39 D. TAPSCOTT, A. TAPSCOTT. Blockchain Revolution. New York, Portfolio Penguim, 
2016, p. 4. 
40 K. SCHWAB, A Quarta Revolução Industrial. Tradução de Daniel Moreira Miranda. São 
Paulo: Edipro, 2016, p. 13. 
41 D. NORTH, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
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power, which rewards creation and reduces dissemination. Thus, 
“incentives for creation and dissemination trade off.”42 
Adam Smith43 recognized that a limited monopoly, such as that 
granted by a patent or copyright, can serve as an appropriate 
reward for costly and risky endeavors. Those limitations are called 
user rights, and they exist to provide a balance in copyright, 
preventing market failures such as unfair market power leverage.44 
They come in the form of freedom of speech, equality of access, 
time limits, and, on some cases, the permission to use copyrighted 
content for non-commercial purposes. These rights and 
exceptions must be regulated and enforced in the online 
environment. Copyrights maximize incentives for productivity, 
and exceptions favour competition and public interest. 
Internet created an unprecedented scenario with exponential 
content creation, including collaborative creation, but failed to 
enforce copyrights. Blockchain presents another opportunity to 
find the much needed effort-reward balance, as long as the 
institutional arrangements reappraise and define how and when to 
limit the rights. Leaders of this new distributed paradigm will 
need to stake their claim and unleash a wave of economic and 
institutional innovation, to ensure this time that the promise if 
fulfilled.45 
Tapscott & Tapscott46 warn that in the advent of the internet 
there was much hope and optimism that it would help with the 
inclusion of developing world citizens in the global economy, but 
instead economic power has gotten more concentrated and 
entrenched as fewer entities use the internet to control and 
acquire more wealth – not to mention the risk of regulatory 
capture. So, there are reasons for concerning if blockchain is 
going down that same path. Not just individuals, but also 
countries in differing stages of economic development must be 
granted access to knowledge. Perhaps, a one size fits all should not 
apply for copyright regulation in the blockchain era, in a 
globalized but unequal world.  
Zingales47 clarifies that certain levels of inequality are essential for 
competition, for the healthy functioning of markets, and thus for 
development. However, even inequality needs to be considered 
 
42 R. COOTER, T. ULEN, Law and Economics. 6th Edition. Berkeley Law Books. Book 2, 
2016, p. 117. 
43 A. SMITH, The Wealth of Nations, Books IV-V. London: Penguin Books, 1999, p. 343. 
44 R. DREYFUSS, et al. Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property - Innovation Policy for the 
Knowledge Society. Oxford University Press, May 24th 2001. 
45 D. TAPSCOTT, A. TAPSCOTT. Blockchain Revolution. New York, Portfolio Penguim, 
2016, p. 25. 
46 Ibidem, pp. 12-13. 
47 L. ZINGALES, Um Capitalismo para o Povo - Reencontrando a Chave da Prosperidade 
Americana, Tradução de Augusto Pacheco Calil, São Paulo, BEI Comunicação, 2015, 
p. 13. 
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fair by most of the people affected by it, and thus, as Bentham48 
explains, it must be supported by merits. 
Whether considering blockchain as a tool, or incorporating it as a 
new institution, prior legal and economic institutions are the ones 
to provide guidelines so that this technology can be a new way of 
pursuing a long date goal, that is, efficiently protecting copyright 
as part of economic development, with equitable distribution of 
social benefits, in balance with private interests. 
CONCLUSION 
Whether it is from a deontological perspective, such as Lockean 
labour and effort theory, or from a utilitarian perspective, that 
considers the social and economic impacts originated by an 
incentive-based system; safeguarding property rights have 
undeniable positive effects. Ownership guides the behavior of 
agents towards the conservation of their goods and the most 
efficient use of it. 
Regarding intellectual property, recognizing authorship and 
ownership is not associated with aspects of material scarcity or 
rivalry in use. It is a privilege granted by the law. The right of 
exclusivity on the use of an intellectual property fulfills the 
purpose of inducing creation and innovation, from the 
perspective of a fair remuneration. 
The diffusion of internet, while providing universalized access to 
information and data, also made it difficult or even impossible to 
properly remunerate the authors. 
This paper aimed to raise questions and intrigue about the 
potential effects of blockchain technology to overcome the 
dilemma that is established between universalized access to 
knowledge and fair remuneration of the creators. 
This depends on the structure and strength of formal and 
informal institutions when it comes to social and economic 
development, especially because it is a globalized but unequal 
world. Different stages of development should be respected in 
order to establish efficient levels of copyright protection, 





48 J. BENTHAM, “An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation”, in 
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